Q3. Discuss the relationship between territory and power with regard to a particular case of migration/mobilityIntro: 500Since the Israeli withdrawal of military rule and settlements from the Gaza strip in 2005, the discussion about Occupied Palestinian Territories refers mainly to the West Bank. There is a great importance in mentioning the distinctive Israeli legal system applied on the Judea and Samaria area (aka the West Bank) that Israel conquered from Jordanians in 1967 during the Six Days War. Israel had been prepared for the days it might conquer territories of its neighbouring countries should and when the latter will open war hence system of military rules and proclamations had been prepared in advance by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The first proclamation that was handed out to the remaining residents of the West Bank after the war, was exposed in the documentary film “The Law in These Parts” (Alexandrowicz, 2011) by Dov Shefi, Brigadier General of the West Bank Military Command. The document contained orders from the West Bank Military High Commander, which strictly limited the mobility of the residents: “The IDF has entered today to this territory and is now in charge over the rule, security and public order in the area … I now declare on curfew in the entire region. All residents must remain in their homes for all hours of the day … Vehicular movement is strictly prohibited. Public gathering of any kind is prohibited…”1 – Israel Defence Force, Proclamation No. 1Overnight, million people became subjects to the new martial legal system and were issued with identity cards. The Palestinians of the West Bank remained under Israeli Martial law, having to obey similar orders that restrict mobility of Palestinians within the territories with very little differences made in the Israeli military rule over the occupied land since then. The new military laws, were created to complement the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), but were also established to separate the law applied on the Palestinians from that of the Israelis, because if the military rule would have applied the Israeli civil law on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, it would mean that the Palestinian residents of these territories will deserve equal rights as of the Israelis, a step that will require the state of Israel to register them as citizens. Furthermore, applying the Israeli law on the occupied territories can be perceived as an attempt to annex the entire area into the internationally accepted borderline of Israel. The shuddering documentary film by Alexandrowicz (2011) reveals through series of interviews with Israel military jurists, the decision-making process of the sets of martial laws, which were applied on the Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories. The interviewees are considered to be the architects of the (then and now) legal system used to organise the rule of law on the occupied population, what strong movie important. According to Meir Shamgar who acted as the Military Advocate General in 1967, the legal team was determined to follow the IHL to silence the international criticism. The IHL of the fourth Geneva Convention rules that an occupying power has the sole responsibility over the welfare, safety and order of the residents of the occupied territory (GC IV, art 47-78). In the West Bank, implementation of this law has been demonstrated through the establishment of public services such as clinics, schools, postal services and infrastructure for electricity, water and telecommunications. It has all changed when Israel, in a blatant violation of the fourth Geneva Convention, sought to annex ’empty’ Palestinian lands and began to build Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. According to article 49 in the fourth Geneva Convention, “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” (GC IV, art 49). This law did not halt the ideological Jewish migration (mainly of Israeli citizens) into the West Bank to launch the settlements project under the assumption that Judea and Samaria area is part of their Eretz Avot (Land of the Forefathers), and that they have biblical-historical claim on this land. The movement of the Jewish settlers extended amongst Israeli citizens and the public pressure on the government called for support in what has been perceived to the international community as mere colonialization. In his book? Cohen describes /asserts (insert cohen). Shamgar asserts in his interview that the Israel government and the martial court of law, insisted that the movement of Israeli citizens into the West Bank is not a violation of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, since the state of Israel neither transfer nor deport its civil population, but rather had only enabled the latter to move voluntarily into the West Bank. The Israeli civil movement into the occupied territories itself, however, is not the only violation of international laws. Article 56 also clearly states that “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.” (GC IV, art 53). The settlements have been built on Palestinian private lands (some were cultivated lands) that were seized by military orders under false justification of a ‘temporarily evacuation’ for the purpose of security needs. Using the land for justified security purposes, enabled the military rule to legalise the seizure of the lands. This claim and cynical use of the international law did not satisfy the Israeli Judicial authority, which opposed these dangerous violations by the military rule in the territories. Soon after, Shamgar, who had left his martial position and held a senior position in the Supreme Court of Israel, made an unprecedented decision to oversight the military rule in the Occupied Territories and to allow the Palestinians residents to appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court against the Israeli military conduct. This supervision enabled the Supreme Court a higher legal authority over the military rule, and has managed to create a ‘diffusion’ of power over the territories by ruling in favour of Palestinian residents and against military orders that were also supported by the executive authority (the Israel Government). According to Shamgar, the Supreme Court of Israel was the first in history to take upon the challenge of doing justice not only with citizens of the sovereign state, but with residents that a state is holding under military occupation, and are considered to be ‘enemies of the state’ (Alexandrowicz, 2011). Following this decision, Palestinian residents appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court claiming that their lands have been seized for civil purposes. In many of the appeals, The Israeli Supreme Court ruled in favour of Palestinians of whom their lands were used to build settlements such as in the case of Elon Moreh, one of the first settlements that were established in the Samaria area. The Supreme Court ordered the Regional Commander to evacuate the settlement and return the land to its lawful owners. The military general Ariel Sharon, who also pushed to move military training camps into the West Bank, used old land laws of former occupiers as a ‘loophole in the law’ where he could present a legal justification to counter the Supreme Court ruling and enable a ‘legal’ continuation to the expansion of settlement on seized lands. Since there was no sovereign Palestinian state, and since the territories were previously subjected to other powers (e.g. the Ottoman rule, followed by the British mandate over Palestine, and then the Jordanian sovereignty), old land laws that were applied on the Arab inhabitants of the land, could still have validation. Sharon referred his justification to the Ottoman Land Code that had been applied on the area in 1858 (Alexandrowicz, 2011). One of the five classifications of this law, is called Maw?t land (dead land). The Maw?t Lands are uncultivated hilly or grazing lands that considered to be at a certain distance from the inhabitant villages. They belonged to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, who could grant temporary permission to the subjects to use the land for cultivation in exchange for payment. However, the latter did not own the land and it belonged to the Ottoman regime. In 1921, when the territories moved under the British rule, the Maw?t Land Ordinance remain the same because the Palestine Administration preferred not to change to current order, and to have the dominion over state lands (Stein, 2017:11). The Maw?t lands are still perceived by the state of Israel as ‘State Lands’ that moved from one sovereignty to another. This law has played a major role in the attempt to ‘legitimise’ Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and enabled further ‘legal’ seizure of Palestinian lands. Subsequent to the ongoing state of occupation and colonialization of their lands, resistance movements against the settlers have begun to emerge amongst the Palestinian residents. The first Intifada (the Palestinian uprising) that lasted from 1987 until 1991, led to a series of movement restriction including the placement of more military checkpoints within the Occupied Territories, which further limited the mobility of the Palestinians. In light of the Second Intifada, which lasted from 2000 until (arguably) 2005, the Israeli population stressed its government to increase the physical mitigation measures on the West Bank territories where the majority of the suicide bombers that launched attacks on Israeli civilians, had come from. Following the public pressure, the National Security Council advised the Israel government to implement the “Seam Zone” plan and to build a barrier, which they described as a ‘security fence’. In the case of Israel, it has been proven that creating a physical barrier on its borders has been the most practical mean to minimise the infiltration of hostile individuals. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has gone through several wars with its neighbours and had to construct physical barriers along the Lebanese and Syrian borders, along the Jordan valley and also around the Gaza strip. Although barriers cannot prevent infiltration completely, it can be used also as a deterrence and monitoring tool that could also ‘buy’ time for the Israeli forces to counter-act any attempt to enter the Israeli sovereign territory. Building a barrier between Israel and the West Bank however, has been a greater challenge due to the expansion (by then) of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, the settlements’ proximity to Palestinian villages, and the movement of tens of thousands of Jewish settlers in and out of the Green Line borders (the 1967 borderline of Israel and the West Bank). Where there was a close proximity of settlements to Palestinian villages, the barrier was constructed by a massive concrete wall to prevent shooting from the Palestinian villages, as in the case of the Jewish neighbourhood Gilo in Jerusalem (Ben and Kra, 2001). Even though the majority of the barrier is made out of barb wire and not concrete wall, it is referred by the Palestinians as ‘the Wall’ or the ‘Segregation Wall’ (Barom, 2004). Wendy Brown for example, describes the wall as a continuation of the segregation progress of aimed to spatially separate the Palestinian from the Israeli population as a manifestation of colonial expansion (Brown, 2010: 29). On the other hand, Ariel Sharon stated his opposition to establishing the fence fearing it will separate between the Israeli settlers and those who live inside 1967 borderline, an act that could send a message to the international community that Israel is willing to let go of all of its territory beyond the fence (Barom, 2004). I agree with Brown’s statement that “state sovereignty cannot be said to have established the historically contingent character of the Wall’s jurisdiction, nor is the Wall ever officially defended as a sovereign jurisdictional border … it appears as a technology in a shifting state approach to a globally unique condition of mingled people, mangled sovereignties, colonial and anti-colonial violence, appropriated and contested lands” (Brown, 2010: 29). Brown tries to compare the exceptional circumstances, intentions, and context of the barrier with other barriers, nevertheless finds very little comparable characteristic in each, such as the U.S. – Mexico wall, which, among other effects, separates indigenous lands and disrupt labour mobility between the communities living on both sides of the wall. Another example This structure of “depth barriers” is why Brown for example (and others) describes the barrier as a “technology of separation and domination in a complex context of settler colonialism and occupation” (Brown, 2010: 30), as opposed to the original purpose it meant to serve. The consensus around the fence:There is a public consensus among Israelis about the necessity of the fence. The late Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon stated his opposition to establishing the fence fearing it will separate between the Israeli settlers and those who live inside 1967 borderline, an act that could send a message to the international community that Israel is willing to let go of all of its territories beyond the fence. The ongoing and increasing numbers of suicide attacks within Israel urban centres have only increased the public opinion that pressured Sharon to surrender to public opinion and to establish the fence. The original purpose of the fence however was for security purposes only. The explanation for making the barrier controversial as such is hidden mainly in the manner of its construction and not in the idea itself. In this aspect, the fence is an interesting test-case where a simple and positive idea was deformed due to the bureaucratic and political consideration, which guided its implementation. The manner of which the wall was constructed – in some areas the planning overlapped the green line and in others, it slipped from the green line into Judea and Samaria territories as if an attempt to re-defining the green line borders. Although this action was justified through operational-security explanations such as the proximity of Israeli towns to the green line, the topography, or the necessity to obtain a certain physical depth to increase the efficiency of the barrier. The political considerations: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the leaders of the settlements had strongly opposed to the idea of the separation fence. When it turned out they cannot handle the public pressure, they have changed the strategy and instead of focusing on building the fence, they focused on changing its route to send the ‘right’ or ‘desired’ political message and not the opposite. The intention was of course to include a bigger number of Jewish settlements as possible into its territory to state that in each future arrangement, Israel have the annexation of these settlements into its sovereign territory. A good example for that is the inclusion of the city of Ariel on the western side of the barrier which means that the barrier will infiltrate many kilometres into the areas of Judea and Samaria and would perpetuate the reality of which the area where the Palestinian people live in, is transverse into little enclaves with little to no connection between them. Moreover, it appeared as if Sharon had planned to take advantage of the fence to enhance his political agenda where a future Palestinian state will sprawl over less than fifty per cents of the Judea and Samaria territories, and surrounded by Israel sovereign territories, or as Sharon described it – a western and eastern security strips. From this reason only, Sharon initiated the plan for the eastern fence, which is aimed at separating the Jordan valley from the Palestinian territories. There is no security justification or necessity for this fence. The Israeli towns in the valley are few in numbers and can be properly secured without a security fence. It is the eastern fence in particular that feeds the provocation of the idea of the fence. Similarly, the fence in the Jerusalem area, has left on its western side many territories that their population is Palestinian, in order not to live a single doubt that Israeli may give up on Palestinian populated areas in any future peace agreement. However, by doing so, Israel also miss the purpose of the fence because it lives Israel bared from any efficient mean to halt mobility of Palestinian from these areas into Israeli population centres. In order to clarify the difference between the “Seam Fence” that will be based on security considerations and the seam which has political considerations involved, there is a need to compare the seam of the current barrier to the one of the green line and the one of the “Geneva havanot”. The current seam will obligate an establishment of a 930 km barrier along, almost three times more than the longtitude of the green line which is 350 km. the Geneva havnot obligates to establish a barrier which is 445 km only. Furthermore, in the Geneva map, there are no Palestinian communities on the Israeli side of the border (do they mean barrier?). Nonetheless, under the plan of the Israel government, over 40 Palestinian villages with approx. 345 thousand Palestinian people, would be included on the Israeli side of the barrier (including Jerusalem area). According to INSS the political changes in the seam fence have led to: 1. a longer more expensive fence, which also obligates to recruit more forces along it which makes it less efficient. 2. The fence interrupt and will continue to interrupt severely in the life routine of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, therefore, the fence has become a source for Palestinian resistance and also a convenient machinery for the anti-Israeli Palestinian propaganda. 3. It appears as if in the international or global public opinion the barrier is not a security fence per-se but a political one that bears only one purpose – to set facts that will influence the future of these territories and perceived as merely another method to rob more territories from the Palestinians. The bureaucratic considerations: were added to the political ones and normally related to the manner of which the security system plan barriers of this kind. Its considerations are supposedly security-related. However, over thirty years of Israel military rule in the occupied territories the security system got used to the fact that in the planning of any bureaucratic procedure, the welfare of the Palestinians will always come last. Three examples to how the priorities have creates an unbearable situation: 1. It was clear that such barrier would need to have a physical depth because every fence is crossable. The fence fulfils its purpose if it detains whoever is trying to cross it, and alert when such attempt happens. If the barrier has depth, then the forces guarding the fence have enough time to intercept the infiltrator. In some areas in the Judea and Samaria the Israeli settlements are very close to their neighbouring Palestinian villages – the operational solution was to build another fence east to the Palestinian village, the result was that a city like Qalqilya found itself caged, surrounded by fences. In this case, the plan went one hand with the vision of the settlements’ leaders as their idea of a fence was not to separate Israel and the areas of Judea and Samaria, but to surround the Palestinian cities. B. although the Palestinians villages have cultivated lands in close proximity to the border, the consideration of deepening the location of the fence beyond the green line prioritised based on Israel defence space and not the welfare of the Palestinian inhabitants. Therefore, the route of the fence was set in a manner that separates the Palestinian villages from their lands while their welfare and their ownership over the land have been completely ignored. (bagaz), furthermore, the barrier also separates between the Palestinian population of these villages and centres, which provide it vital services (e.g. schools, workplaces etc.). political prices: References Cited Alexandrowicz, R. A., 2011. The Law in These Parts. New York, NY: Cinema Guild. (Translated). Ben, A. and Kra, B. (2001). Continuous Fire on Gilo Overnight; IDF to Stay Until Shooting Ends. Haaretz, pp.https://www.haaretz.com/news/continuous-fire-on-gilo-overnight-idf-to-stay-until-shooting-ends-1.68176. Accessed 6 Dec. 2018. Brown, W., 2017. Walled states, waning sovereignty. Mit Press. Barom, S., The Security Fence – a solution or an obstacle. Strategic Assessment, Volume 6, No. 4, February 2004. Available online at The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University http://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/(FILE)1194253338.pdf. Translated from Hebrew. Cohen, GS, Eckstein, Z, & Weiss, Y 2012, Immigration and Labor Market Mobility in Israel, 1990 To 2009, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. 15 January 2018. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Available Online https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/380-600057?OpenDocument Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J. eds., 1997. Culture, power, place: Explorations in critical anthropology. duke University press. Jessop, B., 2006. Spatial fixes, temporal fixes and spatio-temporal fixes (pp. 142-66). Stein, K.W., 2017. The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939. UNC Press Books. p.11. The Declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel Online / auth. Declaration of Independence, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.14 May 1948. http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx. – Official Translation from the Original Declaration in the Hebrew language. White, B., 2011, Palestinians in Israel: Segregation, Discrimination and Democracy, Pluto Press, London. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. 15 January 2018. Zureik, E., Lyon, D. and Abu-Laban, Y. eds., 2010. Surveillance and control in Israel/Palestine: Population, territory and power. Routledge. Haaretz (2001). Continuous Fire on Gilo Overnight; IDF to Stay Until Shooting Ends. online Available at: https://www.haaretz.com/news/continuous-fire-on-gilo-overnight-idf-to-stay-until-shooting-ends-1.68176 Accessed 6 Dec. 2018. the rest fled – 200,000 had left in the territories
1 IDF Proclamation No. 1 as revealed in the documentary film “The Law in These Parts” by Alexandrowicz, R, A. 2011 – was copied and translated.