Gaddis war has finished. [5] Historians such as Gar

Gaddis argues that President Truman went to the Potsdam
Conference, believing that the bomb would be a major factor within political foreign
affairs. Thus, the belief that the sheer power potential of the atomic weapon
would give the United States’ a strong arm when it came to negotiation
capabilities with the Soviets.1
A week into the Potsdam conference, Truman, who was influenced by Churchill,
casually and in a lack of detail said to Stalin that America had created a new,
bomb that they believed could win the war. Stalin, calm and collected, showed
no interest or visible change in emotion to Truman’s surprise.2
 Presidents Truman’s handling of foreign
affairs was based on the fact that America would comfortable rely on its atomic
monopoly for potentially 10 to 15 years before the Soviets could even be close
to an atomic bomb of their own.3
However this of course didn’t actually matter as that the Soviet Union knew
long before Truman of the Bomb. Without their knowledge Stalin already had the
key information and knowledge to create their own atomic weapon. “You are
politically naive if you think they would share information about the weapons
that will dominate the world in the future” said Stalin to his scientist who
asked if they should ask about the bomb to Americans and British when they
first learned of the bomb.4
The Potsdam Conference only solidified Soviet mistrust of the U.S and to
which Gaddis argues began a mind game to strong arm the Soviets. LaFeber,
another historian, also agrees as he states Soon after the meeting Stalin had with
Truman during Potsdam, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M. Molotov
came up to Stalin and said “they’re raising the price”, Stalin replied to
Vyacheslav, “Let them. We’ll have to talk with Kurchatov today about speeding
up our work”. Stalin and his spies own information gathered of the secret Manhattan
Project only reinforced his gut belief that America can not be trusted after
the war has finished. 5

Historians such as Gar Alperovitz presented a new analysis
in 1965 with concluding evidence that re-evaluates the evidence from current
view.   This is brought out in Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The
Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation With Soviet Power,
Alperovitz was able to gain the attention of many historians and scholars with
a view point that justified the necessity to drop the atomic bomb.  The manner at which the “evidence” was
displayed and the reflection of key events and new discussions that brought us
up to August 6, 1945, Alperovitz concluded “Why was the atomic bomb used?” in an
alternative way that pinpointed the elephant in the room at the time of the
1960s, the Soviet union.  Instead of
placing the blame on the face that Japanese’ rejected to surrender as justification
of the need for the atomic bomb, Alperovitz made an inquiry that suggested the
Secretary of State, James Byrnes hadn’t used “the bomb against the cities of
Japan in order to win the war.  But
that our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russia more
manageable in Europe.”6

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Gaddis, John Lewis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An
Interpretive History  (New York: John, Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1978), 173.

John Lewis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War,
1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 244.

LaFeber, Walter America, Russia, and the Cold War, 43.

4 Gaddis, John Lewis, We
now know, 92-3

5Ronald Takaki, Hiroshima: Why America
Dropped the Atomic Bomb  (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 60-1.

6 Alperovitz, Gar,
Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the
American Confrontation with Soviet Power, 242.

6 Gar Alperovitz, The
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth(New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 19

7 Alperovitz, The Decision
to Use the Atomic Bomb, 225.

8Walker, J. S. Prompt and Utter
Destruction Chapel Hill, 50-1